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Eminent Domain Exercised - Stare Decisis
or a Warning: City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders
I. Introduction
The California Supreme Court construed the power of emi-
nent domain1 broadly in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,'
holding that no fundamental rights were violated when the city
condemned 4 a professional football franchise which desired to
move to another city.5 The extent to which a city may use its
power of eminent domain to displace inherent property rights is
an important issue." A significant controversy in the Raiders
case was the circumstances under which such property rights
may be condemned.
This casenote is presented as follows: Part II sets forth the
facts of the case; Part III discusses the background of the legal
issues; Part IV summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions;
Part V analyzes these opinions; and, Part VI concludes that the
majority's view fails to recognize the possible consequences of
1. Eminent domain is "[t]he power to take private property for public use by the
state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions
of public character." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979).
2. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
3. The case was remanded to resolve certain jurisdictional and proof uncertainties.
Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 75, 646 P.2d at 844, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682; see infra text accompa-
nying notes 83-84. For additional discussion of the procedural history of the case, see
infra text accompanying notes 9-13.
4. Condemnation is the "[plrocess of taking private property for public use through
the power of eminent domain." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (5th ed. 1979). See also
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 1 (1965) (condemnation as the exercise of the power of
eminent domain). For the requirements for exercising eminent domain, see infra note 13
& notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 7-13.
6. See generally Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and
Policy, 11 ENWm. L. 1 (1980) (a study of the uses and consequences of eminent domain
in the United States).
Eminent domain is referred to as a "traditional" sovereign power since it dates at
least as far back as the Romans. Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Do-
main, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 204 (1978). See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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the decision for American business.
II. Facts
The Oakland Raiders (the Raiders), a professional football
team, is owned by a partnership directed by Allen Davis, one of
two general partners.7 In 1966, the partnership and the Oakland-
Alameda County Coliseum, Inc., a publicly owned nonprofit cor-
poration, entered into a license agreement for a five-year term
with five three-year renewal options in favor of the partnership.8
Options were exercised in 1970, 1973, and 1976, but not in 1979
for the 1980-81 season.9 The partnership was dissatisfied with
the license agreement and contract negotiations were eventually
terminated.10 When the partnership indicated its intention to
move the franchise to Los Angeles, the City of Oakland com-
menced an action in eminent domain to keep the franchise in
Oakland."
The Monterey County Superior Court granted summary
judgment for the Raiders because "no 'public use' essential to an
eminent domain action could be found, and [because the city)
7. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 63, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The reasons for the city's action were:
1. The Coliseum complex would continue to operate as a public facility and would
continue to meet its bond obligations.
2. The city's residents would continue to enjoy the recreational benefits associated
with the Coliseum and the franchise.
3. The intangible goodwill, community spirit, pride, and mental well-being of the
city's residents would be maintained and increased.
4. The city's continuance of its hundreds of millions of dollars worth of economic
revitalization programs would not be threatened.
Brief for Appellant at 20, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176
Cal. Rptr. 646 (1981) (brief submitted to intermediate appellate court), superseded, City
of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 656, reprinted as modified, City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
The city's counsel described the ultimate "public use" as follows:
[T]he primary objective and purpose of the City is to retain the franchise, and
thus to carry on the primary purpose and objective of the entire Coliseum project.
It is not the City's purpose to indulge in private business or activity, but rather to
pay just compensation for the franchise, an object of personal property bought
and sold routinely on the open market.
Id. at 30.
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lacked the authority to exercise eminent domain for the purpose
of retaining the Raiders' franchise in Oakland."" The appellate
court affirmed, holding that the eminent domain statute"3 "does
12. Brief for Appellant at 7, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646
P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982)(quoting the lower court; trial court decisions are not
reported in California.)
A "public use" is required in order for a municipality to exercise eminent domain.
See infra text accompanying notes 42-52.
13. California's eminent domain statute provides in relevant part:
§ 37350.5 Power of Eminent Domain
A city may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out
any of its powers or functions.
§ 37353 Acquisition for parking, public ways, golf courses
The legislative body may acquire property needed for . . . (c) Golf courses;
provided, however, that no existing golf course may be acquired by means of pro-
ceedings pursuant to eminent domain.
CAL Gov'T CODE § 37350.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983); id. at § 37353 (West 1968).
Other statutes pertinent to the discussion of eminent domain include:
§ 1235.125 Interest
When used with reference to property, "interest" includes any right, title, or
estate in property.
§ 1235.160 Person
"Person" includes any public entity, individual, association, organization,
partnership, trust or corporation.
§ 1235.170 Property
"Property" includes real and personal property and any interest therein.
§ 1235.190 Public Entity
"Public entity" includes the state, a county, city, district, public authority,
public agency, and any other political subdivision in the state.
§ 1240.010 Exercise of power for public use
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property only for a
public use. Where the Legislature provides by statute that a use, purpose, object,
or function is one for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised, such
action is deemed to be a declaration by the Legislature that such use, purpose,
object or function is a public use.
§ 1240.030 Requirements
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a
proposed project only if all of the following are established:
(a) The public interest and necessity require the project.
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most com-
patible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.
§ 1240.050 Property within territorial limits; acquisition; exception
A local public entity may acquire by eminent domain only property within its
territorial limits except where the power to acquire by eminent domain property
outside its limits is expressly granted by statute or necessarily implied as an inci-
dent of one of its statutory powers.
§ 1240.120 Acquisition of property for principal purpose; intent to sell, lease, etc.
acquired property
3
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not authorize the condemnation of the diverse contract rights
necessary to the operation of the Raiders' business enterprise. "14
The City of Oakland then appealed to the California Supreme
Court,'5 the decision of which is the focus of this paper.
III. Background
A. Eminent Domain - A Traditional Power
The power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. 6 For centuries, sovereigns have had the right "to
take private property for reasons of extreme necessity or public
utility upon payment of compensation. 1 7 The historical justifi-
cations for allowing this governmental power have been de-
scribed as notions of natural law,18 concepts of basic sover-
eignty,"0 notions of reserved rights, and historical legitimacy.10
(a) Subject to any other statute relating to the acquisition of property, any
person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary to carry out
and make effective the principal purpose involved including but not limited to
property to be used for the protection or preservation of the attractiveness, safety,
and usefulness of the project.
(b) Subject to any applicable procedures governing the disposition of prop-
erty, a person may acquire property under subdivision (a) with the intent to sell,
lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the property, or an interest therein, sub-
ject to such reservations or restrictions as are necessary to protect or preserve the
attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the project.
§ 1263.010 Rights of property owner; single payment for loss
(a) The owner of property acquired by eminent domain is entitled to compen-
sation as provided in this chapter.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1235.125, .160, .170, .190, 1240.010, .030, .050, .120, 1263.010
(West 1982),
14. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 432, 176 Cal. Rptr. at
650. The intermediate appellate court focused on one issue: whether the intangible na-
ture of the franchise precluded condemnation. The court held that such condemnation
was precluded, since the former eminent domain statute, which related only to "real
property and real property interests, in practice," would not have permitted condemna-
tion. Id. at 431, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 648. See infra text accompanying notes 137-40.
15. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P. 2d 835, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673 (1982).
16. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (1982). See Meidinger, supra note 6, at 5.
17. Berger, supra note 6, at 204.
18. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 5.
19. Id. See also County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 P. 78 (1900) (right
of eminent domain as attribute of sovereignty), reh'g denied, 130 Cal. 637, 63 P. 621
(1901).
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The "natural law" theory emanates from the belief that
government efficiency requires that there be a "competent power
in the legislature to take private property for necessary or useful
public purposes.""' The concept of sovereignty justifies the
power to condemn as a necessary part of a government's su-
preme authority.2 Notions of "reserved rights" are derived from
the theory that since the sovereign had once held all of the na-
tion's land, all subsequent private possession was subject to an
implied reservation permitting the sovereign to retake posses-
sion. 3 The "historical legitimacy" justification arises from case
law suggesting that the power of eminent domain is derived
from the common law."4
Whatever the justifications, eminent domain is "an accom-
plished state of affairs"' 5 which has served many purposes.
Through eminent domain, nations have been able to acquire the
property necessary to expand industry,"' develop the economy
by constructing roads and dams,'7 satisfy aesthetic purposes by
establishing parks and preserves,18 redevelop worn urban areas,' 9
20. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 5-6.
21. Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y.
1816).
22. "The argument is that the power to condemn is inherent in the exercise of sov-
ereignty. It is necessary to the existence of government, and all governments, by the
circular implication, possess it." Meidinger, supra note 6, at 5-6 n.12. This justification is
also present in the California eminent domain statute. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37350.5 (West
Supp. 1983). See supra note 13. "Its purpose is to give a city adequate authority to carry
out its municipal functions." Eminent Domain Law, 13 CAL. L. REv. COMM. REPORTS
1001 (1975), reprinted in CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37350.5 (West Supp. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION REPORTS].
The difficulty lies in defining what are necessary "powers and functions." See infra
note 42.
23. This theory probably originated with the civil law writer, Hugo Grotius, who
seems to be the originator of the term "eminent domain." See 1 NICHOLS, NICHOLS' THE
LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.1211, 1.13[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1981); Berger, supra note 6, at
204.
24. In Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, the court justified the "just
compensation" requirement by stating that "in taking private property for public uses
... the limitation is admitted by the soundest authorities, and is adopted by all temper-
ate and civilized governments from a deep and universal sense of its justice." Gardner v.
Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. at 166.
25. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 6.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 23.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id. at 33.
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and provide "private ways of necessity."30
B. Exercising the Power of Eminent Domain
1. Requirements
Both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution establish two prerequisites for a proper exercise of
eminent domain:"' the property taken must be for a public use
and the owner must receive just compensation.3 2 California stat-
utes mandate furthers that the project for which the property is
sought be designed to maximize the public benefit and to mini-
mize the private injury, and that the property be necessary" for
30. Id. at 14, 29.
The power is not limited to public entities. In University of So. Cal. v. Robbins, the
court held that a private corporation may be granted the right to take land under emi-
nent domain for purposes of constructing a university library. University of So. Cal. v.
Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P.2d 163 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 738 (1935).
31. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment's due process clause imposed
the same requirements on the states. No state shall "deprive any person of... property
without due process of law ...." Id. at XIV, § 1. "Private property may be taken or
damaged for public use only when just compensation ... has first been paid to ... the
owner." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. (emphasis added).
These two requirements are also contained in the state statute. CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE §§ 1240.010, 1263.010 (West 1982). See supra note 13. The "public use" require-
ment is occasionally referred to as the "public purpose" requirement. See Raiders, 32
Cal. 3d at 69, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679; Meidinger, supra note 6, at 43.
There is authority, however, that illustrates how the terms are not always synonymous.
See Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regula-
tion and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 284-86 (1982).
32. Id.
33. See supra note 13.
34. The issue of whether an exercise of eminent domain is "necessary" is a legisla-
tive matter. "The general rule of necessity... is not a matter of judicial cognizance but
one for the determination of the legislative branch of the government.... " Adirondack
Ry. v. New York State, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900).
The California Code provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution
of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity ... conclusively estab-
lishes [necessity]." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.250 (West 1982) (emphasis added). The
justification is said to involve "sound policy reasons. [N]o matter how qualified and
learned a particular court may be.... a court is not the suitable agency or tribunal to
make such complex non-legal determinations." Lavine, Extent of Judicial Inquiry into
Power of Eminent Domain, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 369, 376 (1955) (emphasis added). The
only time that the issue of necessity is questionable by the courts (in California) is when
there is a "gross abuse of discretion by the governing body." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1245.255 (West 1982). However, the issue of whether an exercise of eminent domain is
for a "public use" is justiciable. See infra note 38.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/8
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the project.3 5
If these conditions are satisfied, 6 a public entity in Califor-
nia, such as a city,31 has the authority to condemn private prop-
erty. In case of controversy, the courts have subject matter juris-
diction over the issues of "public use" and "just
compensation."38
2. Defining a "Public Use"
The meaning of "[a] public use defies absolute definition,
for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances
in the sciences, changing conceptions of the scope and functions
of government,sa and other differing circumstances brought
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982). See supra note 13.
36. The burden of proving that the proposed condemnation is not for a "public use"
rests on the condemnee (i.e. the person whose property is sought to be taken by eminent
domain). See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962); People ex
rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d 206, 215-16, 436 P.2d 342, 348, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 348 (1968).
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37350.5 (West Supp. 1983). See supra note 13.
38. This Note addresses only the "public use" issue. The "just compensation" re-
quirement was not at issue in Raiders. Brief for Appellant at 8, City of Oakland v. Oak-
land Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 422, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1981).
For a discussion of just compensation and the property rights involved, see
Humbach, supra note 32.
Other than the "public use" and "just compensation" issues, "[a]ll other questions
involved in the taking of private property are of a legislative nature." University of So.
Cal. v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d at 525, 37 P.2d at 164. One commentator noted: "It has
been said that the law has finally eliminated the public use requirement as an effective
barrier to takings. This is most certainly a vast overstatement of what the law is." Ber-
ger, supra note 6, at 223.
Furthermore, the Law Revision Commission's comments state that the revised stat-
ute "does not preclude judicial review to determine whether the proposed use in a partic-
ular case is actually a public use." COMMISSION REPORTS supra note 22. See, e.g., People
ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. 2d at 215-16, 436 P.2d at 348, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 348.
If the legislature declares, however, that a "public use" does exist, this decision is
said to be "entitled to great weight and it is not the duty or prerogative of the courts to
interfere with such legislative finding[s] unless it clearly appears to be erroneous and
without reasonable foundation." Housing Auth. v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. 2d 437, 449-50, 94
P. 2d 794, 801 (1939) (emphasis added). The emphasized portion is the standard an-
nounced by the Law Revision Commission. See COMMISSION REPORTS supra note 22.
39. A "function of government" is a broad term. In California, it has been employed
by the courts to include:
(1) "[T]he acquisition, construction, maintenance and repair of roads and
streets," (Blum v. City and County of San Francisco, 200 Cal. App. 2d 639, 646, 19
Cal. Rptr. 574, 578 (1st Dist. 1962));
7
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about by an increase in population and new modes of communi-
cation and transportation."'40
In determining whether a proposed taking would be for a
public use, courts frequently examine "the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the particular subject-matter in regard to
which the character of the use is questioned. '41 Considerations
include whether "[a]n elementary object of . . . [the] govern-
ment [action] is to further the . ..general welfare of the peo-
ple," s or whether there is "anything calculated to promote the
education, the recreation or the pleasure of the public. ' 43 Under
the guise of such considerations, courts have gone so far as to
hold that "alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the eco-
nomic base of the community" 44 are valid reasons for exercising
the power of eminent domain.
Proposed condemnations deemed not to satisfy the public
use requirement include those where the government intends to
use a business as the original owner did. West River Bridge Co.
v. Dix45 affirmed the principle that "[n]o state. . .[can] resume
(2) "[T]he furnishing of fire protection," (Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Board of Supervisors, 166 Cal. App. 2d 519, 529, 333 P.2d 378, 385 (2d Dist.
1958));
(3) "[Elducation, public health, street maintenance," (Atlas Hotels, Inc. v.
Acker, 230 Cal. App. 2d 658, 666, 41 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (4th Dist. 1964));
(4) "[Tjraffic regulation," (People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 227, 352 P. 2d 519,
525, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151, 227, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960));
(5) "[D]issemination of information," (Kilgore v. Younger, 30 Cal. 3d 770,
782, 640 P.2d 793, 800, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (1982));
(6) "[Olperation of the courts," (Allegrezza v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d
948, 952, 121 Cal. Rptr. 245, 248 (1st Dist. 1975)); and,
(7) [Wlhatever "local government is authorized to do," (Northeast Sacra-
mento County Sanitation Dist. v. Northridge Park County Water Dist. of Sacra-
mento County, 247 Cal. App. 2d 317, 325, 55 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (3d Dist. 1966)).
40. Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523, 527 (1953) (footnote
added).
41. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist, v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 160 (1896).
42. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 473,
292 A.2d 580, 589 (1971), modifying 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed, East
Rutherford v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
43. Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 582, 133 P. 294, 296 (1913). See also
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
44. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981). For the court's determination that owning an established sports
team is an appropriate function of the city, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
45. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (McLean, J., concurring).
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a charter, under the power of appropriation, and carry on the
functions of the corporations . . .. The power [of eminent do-
main] must not only be exercised bona fide by a State, but the
property, not its product, must be applied to public use."'4" As-
suming the functions of the condemned business, under this rea-
soning, would not be a valid "public use." '47
Even if the condemnor were to transfer the condemned
property to a third party, the public use requirement would not
be fulfilled.
[T]he property of the city, held in trust for public uses [can] not
be turned over to [a private] corporation. And the conclusion [is]
not altered by the circumstance that the purposes to which the
property was to be applied were, to some extent at least, within
the scope of municipal activities."8
This concept is supported by cases which have held that "[t]he
State has no right to condemn land solely for resale to private
ownership.' '
3. Property subject to condemnation
The California statute allows for the condemnation of "any
property."60 Since property is defined as including "real and per-
sonal property and any interest therein,"51 both tangible and in-
tangible property are subject to eminent domain.2 It is unclear,
46. Id. at 537. "[T]he courts have universally read... [the public use] provisions as
a proscription against takings for a private purpose." Berger, supra note 6, at 205.
47. In Poletown Neighborhood Council, the court stated that "[tihe heart of this
dispute is whether the proposed condemnation is for the primary benefit of the public or
the private user." Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. at 632,
304 N.W.2d at 458.
48. Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. at 584, 133 P. at 297.
49. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't v. 9.88 Acres of Land, 253 A.2d 509, 512 (Del.
1969) (emphasis added); see also Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171
(1959); Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. at 584, 133 P. at 297 ("use by a private
corporation... [is] not a public use"); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Town of Cicero, 157
Ill. 48, 53-54, 41 N.E. 640, 641 (1895).
50. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 37350.5 (West 1982). See supra note 13.
51. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1235.170 (West 1982) (emphasis added). See supra note
13. The Law Revision Commission's comments state that the statute is intended to en-
compass "all interests in property of whatever character or extent." COMMISSION REPORTS
supra note 22.
52. "[C]ontracts are subject to the right of... eminent domain." El Paso v. Sim-
mons, 379 U.S. 497, 525, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965). Furthermore, the Supreme
1983]
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however, whether intangible property alone may be condemned
or whether it must be associated with tangible property that is
being condemned.53
IV. Decision of the Court
A. The Majority Opinion
The issues in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders were, ac-
cording to the majority, whether intangible property is subject
to condemnation 54 and whether the proposed taking was in fur-
therance of a "public use." 55 After discussing briefly the origins
and broad scope of the power of eminent domain," the court
considered California's revised statute,57 which gives its cities
the power to condemn."
The court, while acknowledging that the intent of the stat-
ute is to define property as broadly as possible,5 9 noted that
there is little applicable California law with respect to the con-
demnation of the contractual and other rights involved.0 The
court observed, however, that case law 1 indicates and commen-
tators62 agree that the condemnation of intangible property is
Court has long recognized that: "A franchise is property, and nothing more; it is incorpo-
real property. .. ." West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 534.
53. See infra note 129.
54. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
55. Id. Recall that the "public use" issue is justiciable, unlike the "necessity" issue.
See supra notes 32, 34 & 38.
56. Justice Richardson stated that any constitutional provisions "merely place limi-
tations upon" the exercise of eminent domain, indicating that whatever powers are not
specifically excluded are implicitly included. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 64, 646 P.2d at 838,
183 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
57. See supra note 13 for reprinted portions of the pertinent sections.
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 37350.5 (West Supp. 1983). See supra note 13.
59. See COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 22, at 1001 (comments pertaining to the
definition of property for eminent domain purposes).
60. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 66, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
61. Id. at 67, 646 P.2d at 839-40, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
The court cited several cases in the inverse condemnation context. See, e.g., Arm-
strong v. United States, 364. U.S. 40 (1960), on remand, 287 F.2d 577 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (de-
struction of materialmen's liens on boats held compensable taking); Monongahela Nay.
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (destruction of the value of franchise held
compensable taking).
62. Id. at 67, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (citing NICHOLS, supra note 23,
at § 2.1[2]).
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acceptable. The court concluded on the basis of legislative in-
tent,'s the lack of contrary precedent, 64 and the general accept-
ance of the condemnation of intangibles 65 that distinguishing be-
tween different types of property is irrelevant,6 and held that
the state eminent domain statute authorizes the condemnation
of intangible property.6 7
To resolve the "public use" issue, the court set forth basic
guidelines. It had previously defined "public use" as "a use
which concerns the whole community or promotes the general
interest in its relation to any legitimate object of government."68
The court also noted that "the general statutory scheme would
appear to afford cities considerable discretion in identifying and
implementing public uses. ' 9 Having established this deferential
level of scrutiny, the court cited examples of public entities70
that had condemned recreational facilities such as stadiums.7"
Despite these broad guidelines, the court declined, on the record
before it, to decide the issue it had framed: whether the "differ-
ence between managing and owning the facility in which the
game is played, and managing and owning the team which plays
in the facility [is] legally substantial."'72 Although the court's
language implied that there is no difference, the court did not
preclude a contrary conclusion on a fuller record.7 3 Furthermore,
63. Id. at 68, 646 P.2d at 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
64. Id. at 66, 646 P.2d at 839, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
65. Id. at 67, 646 P.2d at 839-40, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
66. This determination is consonant with the legislature's broad definition of prop-
erty in this context. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 68, 646 P.2d at 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (the court's holding on this issue
was identical to the trial court's holding).
68. Id. at 69, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679. This test was announced in
Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 289 P.2d 1, 6 (1955).
69. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 70, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
70. For California's list of "public entities," see CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1235.190
(West 1982). See supra note 13.
71. On this issue, the court wrote: "The examples of Candlestick Park in San Fran-
cisco and Anaheim Stadium in Anaheim both owned and operated by municipalities,
further suggest the acceptance of the general principle that providing access to recrea-
tion to its residents in the form of spectator sports is an appropriate function of city
government." Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 71, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
72. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (emphasis added).
73. Indeed, the court's original conclusion, before it was modified, was that this dif-
ference "seem[ed] legally insubstantial." City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d
656 (1982) (available Oct., 1982, on LEXIS, States Library, Cal. file).
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the court concluded that the acquisition and operation of a
sports franchise may be an appropriate municipal function. 4
The Raiders' argument that it is improper for the city to
condemn an established sports team7 5 was quashed by the ma-
jority's statutory construction.7 6 The court reasoned that since
the condemnation of an existing golf course is specifically forbid-
den,7 a municipality may condemn any other "existing business
unless expressly forbidden to do so. ''78 Similarly, the majority
disposed of the Raiders' argument that if the city were to trans-
fer ownership to private parties after condemning the Raiders,
then it would be violating principles of eminent domain.7 The
court pointed to the language in the eminent domain statute:
"[A] person may acquire property under subdivision (a) with the
intent to sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of the prop-
erty . . . ."8 This language, the court suggested, gives the city
authority to acquire the franchise even if it intends a subse-
quent transfer.81
Having dealt with the Raiders' primary arguments on ap-
peal, the court directed the trial court to make inquiry into two
factual issues.8 2 First, the trial court must determine whether
the intangible nature of the property rights constituted property
that is within the territorial limitations required by statute.88
Second, the trial court must consider evidence of the "public"
nature of the use to determine whether a valid "public use"
exists.84
74. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 72, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
75. Id. at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
76. Id.
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 37353 (West 1968). See supra note 13.
78. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 73-74, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
1240.120(b) (West 1982). See supra note 13.
81. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
82. Id. at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
83. Id. at 75, 646 P.2d at 844, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1240.050
(West 1982). See supra note 13.
84. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 75, 646 P.2d at 844, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
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B. The Concurrence
Chief Justice Bird, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, warned that the eminent domain power, as defined by the
majority, was "virtually without limit," 85 but she conceded that
the current state of the law forced her to agree with the result.86
The Chief Justice cautioned that this result implies that a
city may seize any "viable, ongoing business 8 7 which attempts
to leave the city. She questioned whether it is proper for a mu-
nicipality to invade property rights in the furtherance of policy
interests in this context,88 describing condemnation for the sole
purpose of preventing relocation as "dangerous and
heavyhanded." 8
Chief Justice Bird stated, however, that since eminent do-
main is generally a legislative matter, the judicial branch can in-
tervene only when the legislative action reflects a "gross abuse of
discretion" 90 or the statute is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] totally
lacking in evidentiary support."91 Finding none of these condi-
tions present in the instant case, she concurred with the major-
ity's decision.2
V. Analysis
The majority pointed out that the two main issues of the
case were: first, whether the intangible nature of the property
allows for condemnation," and second, whether the proposed
taking would constitute a "public use.' '9
85. Id. at 76, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 77, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
88. Id. at 77, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
89. Id. at 78, 646 P.2d at 846, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
90. Id. at 79, 646 P.2d at 846, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255 (West 1982)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 64, 646 P.2d 835, 837, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1982).
94. Id.
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A. Public Use
1. There is a difference between owning a team and own-
ing the stadium in which the team plays
A severe weakness in the court's opinion is its handling of
the following question: "Is the obvious difference between man-
aging and owning the facility in which the game is played, and
managing and owning the team which plays in the facility, le-
gally substantial?"'5 Although the court did not answer the
question, finding the record incomplete, the opinion implies that
the answer is no."
The court, by finding no objection to condemning an ex-
isting team, contravened the concept that a municipality may
not condemn a business in order to use it as the original owner
did.97 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court when faced with an
analogous factual matrix resolved, in dictum, that a city ordi-
nance authorizing a loan to build a sports complex was valid, but
stated that "there would be no conflict with the public nature of
the stadium, for the City would be entering into the lease, not to
engage in the private business of promoting sporting events...
(which might be a private, not a public, use)."e According to
this reasoning, if the City of Oakland intended to conduct the
Raiders' business itself, the "use," arguably, would be "private,"
not "public." Since the courts have universally read the public
use requirement as a proscription against takings for a private
purpose,9' the city's proposed condemnation is improper.
The court's answer to the preceding argument was that
since the state statute expressly prohibits the condemnation of
an existing golf course,100 but not the condemnation of any other
businesses,101 other businesses may be condemned. 02 The court
95. Id. at 72, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (emphasis added).
96. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
98. Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 18, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (1966) (empha-
sis added).
99. Berger, supra note 6, at 205.
100. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 37353 (West 1968). See supra note 13.
101. A golf course is not the same as the business that is operating the golf course.
The majority confused property, such as a stadium, with other property, such as a team,
which is a business.
102. See Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 60, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
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inappropriately applied the maxim of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius.'0 3 It seems illogical to conclude that the legisla-
ture's intent was to discriminate against every business in favor
of golf. The court made no effort to ascertain the legislature's
reason for specifically mentioning golf courses."1 4 At the very
least, this anomaly requires examination of the legislative intent
for such an exception, rather than mechanical application of a
statutory maxim.
Even under the majority's interpretation of the statute, the
city does not have the authority to take control of the Raiders'
business activities under traditional interpretations of "public
use." 0 5 In the past, California courts have unequivocally stated :
"[Iln the absence of express legislative sanction,... [cities have]
no authority to engage in any independent business enterprise
or occupation such as is usually pursued by private
individuals."106
If the city did not intend to manage the Raiders, but to
transfer the business to a third party immediately after condem-
nation, it still would be overreaching its authority.10 7 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that "the property of the city,
held in trust for public uses [can] not be turned over to [a pri-
vate] corporation."10 8 Furthermore, courts have recognized that
states have no right to condemn land solely for resale to private
parties.109 Thus, if the Raiders court's view that tangible prop-
erty (land) and intangible property (a sports franchise) are on
103. This cannon of statutory construction is that the inclusion of one possibility
excludes the rest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
104. A more plausible explanation for the legislature's special mention of golf
courses in the statute concerns the indivisibility of a golf course; i.e., a golf course with
less than eighteen holes is useless.
105. The court cited the following cases as authority for this proposition: Ravettino
v. City of San Diego, 70 Cal. App. 37, 160 P.2d 52 (1945); Brougher v. Board of Public
Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928), later appealed at, 107 Cal. App. 15, 290 P. 140
(1930); Vallejo Ferry Co. v. City of Vallejo, 146 Cal. 392, 80 P. 514 (1905); Low v. City of
Marysville, 5 Cal. 214 (1855).
106. See, e.g., Ravettino v. City of San Diego, 70 Cal. App. at 44, 160 P.2d at 56
(emphasis added).
107. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
108. Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 584, 133 P. 294, 297 (1913).
109. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't v. 9.88 Acres of Land, 253 A.2d 509, 512
(Del. 1969).
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equal footing for eminent domain purposes'" is accepted, it fol-
lows that a city has no right to condemn a franchise solely for
resale to a private corporation.
The majority's analysis does not overcome this conclusion
despite its reliance on statutory authority. The majority argued
that condemnation of the Raiders followed by an immediate
transfer would be valid under the statute."' According to the
statute, however, to "acquire property... with the intent to sell,
lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of [it]," the property must
first be "acquire[d] property."" '2 Otherwise, a city could obtain
any property for any actual purpose as long as its "intended"
purpose was to transfer the property. Thus, the majority's argu-
ment only serves to beg the question: may the city condemn the
Raiders? Since the city may neither own the Raiders itself'"1 nor
transfer the Raiders to a third party, the correct answer should
be no.""
110. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
111. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
112. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1240.120(b) (West 1982). See supra note 13.
113. If a city did own a team, the players would necessarily be public employees
who, in California (which follows the common law rule), are not allowed to strike. San
Diego v. American Fed'n of State Employees, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258
(1970). See 52 CAL. Jun. 3D, Public Lands § 182 n.71 (1979) (for additional citations).
Therefore, since the players of all of the other teams of the National Football League
may strike, the city, in effect, would be discriminating against its own players; there
might be an equal protection violation under the fourteenth amendment.
114. This seems to be the city's actual intention. See supra note 11 for excerpts of
the city's brief. In Egan v. City of San Francisco, the city condemned property, allowed
a private corporation to build an opera house on it, and then sought to transfer absolute
control to the corporation. The court stated that "[t]he public use of public property
cannot, under any provisions of charter, or statute ... coexist with private management
and control of such property." Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. at 583-84, 133 P.
at 296. The court concluded that "[iff the management of an opera house constitues a
public use, the public character of the use can exist only so long as the control is re-
tained in the hands of some public agency." Id. at 584, 133 P. at 297 (emphasis added).
Transferring the ownership of condemned property to a third party violates the
principle that "the property of one individual cannot, without his consent, be devoted to
the private use of another, even when there is an incidental or colorable benefit to the
public." New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 343, 1 N.E.2d 153, 156
(1936).
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2. The city's intended use is not a proper government
function
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane,"5
cited with approval by the majority,"" lists the following criteria
for determining whether the intended use is a proper govern-
ment function:117 that the "activity or service has been histori-
cally engaged in by local government; that it is widely so fur-
nished today; that it would not be performed as well by a
private corporation, and that it is or cannot be undertaken for
private profit." 11 8 A facility'" such as a sports complex may sat-
isfy all these criteria for economic reasons.12 0 None of these cri-
teria, however, would be satisfied by a football franchise.
Unlike the condemnation of numerous sports facilities, such
as Candlestick Park and Anaheim Stadium, ' 2 a sports team has
never been condemned."2 Thus, it can not be said that govern-
ments have historically engaged in operating sports teams or
that such activity by government is widely furnished today.
115. 119 N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580 (1971).
116. Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 71, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
117. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. at 488, 292
A.2d at 598.
118. Id. The case also states that an elementary object of the condemnation is to
further the general welfare. Id. at 473, 292 A.2d at 589.
"[L]egislation to be justified and supported by [the term general welfare] must at
least promote the welfare of the general public as contrasted with that of a small per-
centage or insignificant numerical proportion of the citizenry." In re Kazas, 22 Cal. App.
2d 161, 172-73, 70 P.2d 962, 968 (1937). Applying this standard to the Raiders, it could
be argued that keeping the team in the city would economically benefit the general pub-
lic and not merely a small percentage of the city's citizens. However, the concept of
prohibiting a business from moving to another city contravenes fundamentals of free
enterprise and thus, does not "promote the [general] welfare of the general public" of
California. Id.
119. McCrane involved the condemnation of land on which a sports complex was to
be built. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. at 463-64,
292 A.2d at 584.
120. Government financing is needed due to the extensive costs of building sports
facilities. Id. at 489, 292 A.2d at 598. The court concluded: "[T]he view that the con-
struction and maintenance of stadiums and related facilities constitutes a public purpose
has received virtually universal approval in most jurisdictions." Id. at 488, 292 A.2d at
598 (emphasis added).
121. See supra note 71.
122. See generally note 60 and accompanying text. Presumably, if any sports team
had been condemned, the condemnation would have been challenged and the court
would have cited the results of such a court challenge.
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Similarly, while a private corporation may find it economically
burdensome to operate a sports facility,12 3 it is clear that private
ownership of sports teams has not only been performed well but
that it has been done so for private profit. This is evident from
the fact that almost every professional sports team in America is
privately owned.
B. The Intangible Nature of the Franchise
Two Supreme Court cases indicate that an exercise of emi-
nent domain directed primarily at a contract would violate the
right to contract. Justice McLean's concurrence in West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix"4 suggests that where the primary target of
condemnation proceedings is intangible property, there may be
constitutional problems.125 In avoiding the conclusion that con-
demnation of contractual rights would be an impairment of the
constitutional right to contract, 2 6 Justice McLean resolved that
"[t]he power [of eminent domain] acts upon the property and
not on the contract.' ' 2 7 Similarly, in Long Island Water Supply
Co. v. Brooklyn,'" any possible impairment of a contract was
justified as a consequence of the appropriation of tangible prop-
erty, the contract being a mere incident to that property.
Thus, since the Raiders' franchise is comprised primarily of
contracts, it cannot properly be the target of condemnation
under the Supreme Court's reasoning. The precedent relied on
by the majority in Raiders addresses the situation where the pri-
mary target of the condemnation was tangible property12 9 to be
used for stadiums, 30 opera houses,"' fairgrounds,' 3 2 and park
123. On the other hand, a public entity (the sovereign) would not find such activity
economically burdensome. This is related to the theory that condemnation is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
124. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 536 (1848) (McLean, J., concurring).
125. See generally id. at 538-39.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. "No state shall... pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts ... ." Id.
127. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 536 (McLean, J., concurring).
128. 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897).
129. It is clear that intangible property is subject to condemnation. See supra text
accompanying notes 50-52. It is unclear if such property is condemnable without being
linked to condemned tangible property. See supra note 53 and accompanying text
130. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 2d 423, 333 P.2d 745 (1959).
131. Egan v. City of San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 133 P. 294 (1913).
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areas."8 On the basis of West River Bridge and Long Island
Water, there is a legally substantial difference between con-
demning predominantly intangible property, such as a franchise,
and predominantly tangible property, such as a facility. The au-
thority cited by the majority, dealing with tangible property, is
not germane to the Raiders situation. The legislative intent be-
hind California's eminent domain statute provides further sup-
port for the distinction between tangible and intangible prop-
erty."" The statute, allowing for the condemnation of any
conceivable property interest,3 5 seems to favor the city. Accord-
ing to the Law Revision Commission, however, "the Eminent
Domain Law is basically a reorganization and restatement of ex-
isting California law with numerous minor changes of a techni-
cal or corrective nature."" This statement, together with a judi-
cially recognized concession by the city, in the lower court, that
"the taking here would not have been possible under the former
law,' 7 implies that the proposed condemnation would be
invalid.
C. Constitutional Implications
Under the majority's interpretation of the California emi-
nent domain statute, a municipality may condemn any existing
business unless expressly forbidden to do so.isa This authoriza-
132. County of Alameda v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 80, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 474 (1st Dist. 1964).
133. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923). See also Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (shipbuilding materials); Ligget & Meyers Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 215 (1927) (tobacco products); Porter v. United States, 473
F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973) (personal effects of Lee Harvey Oswald); City of N. Sacramento
v. Citizens Util. Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (3d Dist. 1961) (water sup-
ply system); University of So. Cal. v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P.2d 163 (1934)
(land for university library); In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219
N.E.2d 410, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1966) (bus company's property); Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp. v. Milwaukee County, 82 Wis. 2d 420, 263 N.W.2d 503 (1978) (mass
transit system).
134. See COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 22.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
136. Recommendation Proposing the Eminent Domain Law, 12 CAL. L. REV. COMM.
REPowrs 1619 (1974) (emphasis added).
137. Raiders, 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 425, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646, 648. Under the prior
Code of Civil Procedure, only real property and real property interests were condemna-
ble. See id.
138. Raiders, 30 Cal. 3d at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
1983]
19
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:169
tion effectively allows cities in California to keep any business in
California from moving to another part of the state or to a dif-
ferent state. Such power in local government raises two potential
constitutional problems: an infringement on the right to travel,
and an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
1. A corporation's right to travel
The freedom to travel throughout the United States has
long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.189
The right to interstate travel has been described as "a 'funda-
mental' right which.., should be regarded as having its source
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."''4
Corporations are generally designated as "artificial per-
son[s]."'4 As a result, their constitutional rights are said to be
measured by the same laws as the rights of a natural person.142
Still, "the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with
all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons.' 143 The issue of
whether corporations enjoy a right to travel depends on whether
the right was intended to be purely personal."'
139. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). "The right to travel is a part
of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment .... Freedom of movement across frontiers ... and inside fron-
tiers as well, was a part of our heritage." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958).
140. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
141. A corporation is an artificial person, and in situations where it is capable of
functioning, its rights, duties, and liabilities do not differ from those of a natural person
under similar conditions. Under the federal Constitution, the rights of a corporation are
to be measured by the same laws as the rights of a person, as both come within the
purview of the fourteenth amendment. A corporation may invoke the equal protection
and due process clauses of that amendment against any proscribed action by the state.
15 CAL. JUR 3D, Corporations § 9 (1979).
142. Id.
143. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824, reh'g denied, 438 U.S.
907 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. In Bellotti, a first amendment case, the Court stated: "The proper question ...
is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are
coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the
statute infringes the right] meant to [be] protect[edl." Id. at 776.
Furthermore, one commentator has noted the limitations on the constitutional
rights afforded corporations. He wrote:
Purely personal guarantees are unavailable to corporations and other organiza-
tions where the historic function of the guarantee has been limited to the protec-
tion of the individual. Whether a particular guarantee is purely personal or is un-
available to corporations for some other reason depends upon the nature, history,
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/8
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Since one possible source of the right to travel suggested by
the Supreme Court is the commerce clause, " " it is conceivable
that there is a link between the right to travel and interstate
commerce. Thus, any corporation which was barred from freely
crossing state borders would have its right to interstate travel
violated. The right to travel interstate may not be violated ab-
sent a compelling governmental interest justifying the constitu-
tional infringement. 4 It is difficult to imagine an interest com-
pelling enough to justify restraining the movement and,
necessarily, the expansion of business in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has held that a state may not "in any form
or under any guise, directly burden the prosecution of interstate
business. '1 47
More germane to the Raiders situation" 8 is the right to in-
trastate travel which has been acknowledged by both the fed-
era e149 and the California courts.150 Although the Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed the scope of this right,' 5 ' one fed-
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision which is being asserted by
the organization.
9 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPED A OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4248.1 (Supp. 1982).
145. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 666.
146. The Supreme Court announced this level of scrutiny in Maher v. Roe, where it
wrote: "[C]ases involving the right to travel have consistently held that statutes penaliz-
ing the fundamental right to travel must pass muster under the compelling-state-interest
test, irrespective of whether the statute actually deters travel." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 488 (1977).
147. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910).
148. The Raiders are not a corporation but a limited partnership. See supra text
accompanying note 7.
149. In arguing that the right to interstate travel necessarily implies a right to intra-
state travel, a federal court stated that "[ilt would be meaningless to describe the right
to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowl-
edge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state." King v. New Rochelle
Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); see also
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), where the Court asserted that all citizens
"must have the right to pass and repass through every part of [the United States] with-
out interruption, as freely as in our own States." Id. at 492. This clearly indicates the
assumption of a right to intrastate travel.
150. In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 148, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (5th Dist. 1979).
"[T]he right to intrastate travel ... is a basic human right protected by the United
States and California Constitutions as a whole." Id.
151. The Supreme Court noted the distinction, but did not address the scope, stat-
ing- "[A] constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel [is] a ques-
tion we do not now consider .... " Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
255-56 (1974); see also In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 148 n.3, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 567 n.3.
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eral court described it as a "correlative" of the constitutional
right to interstate travel.1 52 A failure to recognize this right
"could produce irrational results' 15 3 with regard to typical geo-
graphical circumstances.
The right to travel intrastate is violated when the right to
"migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life'" is in-
fringed upon. Generally, this standard applies to durational resi-
dency requirements under which an individual must live in a ju-
risdiction for a statutory period before becoming entitled to
certain benefits. 5 5 The right to interstate travel, and thus the
right to intrastate travel as well,"' has been expanded, however,
to include situations where a violation of civil rights adversely
affects citizens' free movement through commerce. "'
An infringement of the right to intrastate travel must either
be justified by "legitimate governmental demands" 58 or sub-
jected to a balancing test.'"
The right of a California corporation to travel intrastate is
endangered by the majority's interpretation of the eminent do-
152. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d at 648.
153. Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1129,
1145-46 (1975).
The author provides an excellent example:
[I]n Cole v. Housing Authority, the First Circuit invalidated a city ... durational
residence requirement for admittance to low income housing in Newport, Rhode
Island. In light of Shapiro there was little doubt that the requirement could not
exclude a plaintiff who had recently moved from New York. But a second plaintiff
had moved from Providence, and thus was penalized only for intrastate travel. If
the right to travel were only applicable interstate, a court would have been in the
anomalous position of permitting the exclusion of persons who moved less than
thirty miles while invalidating the exclusion of persons who had moved several
hundreds of miles. The more logical conclusion was reached by the Cole court.
Id. at 1146 (citing Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
154. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 255. This doctrine originated
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629.
155. In Shapiro v. Thompson, residents of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia were denied welfare assistance since they had not lived in their respec-
tive jurisdictions long enough. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 642.
156. See supra note 151.
157. In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (5th Dist. 1979) (probation
of prostitute was conditioned so that she was excluded from certain high prostitution
areas of the city).
158. Id. at 149-50, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (California's standard).
159. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp 1242, 1262 (M.D. Pa.), afl'd
without opinion, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
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main statute since the condemnation of the corporation would
eliminate its being able to "migrate" or "resettle." That is, by
the definition of eminent domain,'60 a corporation's free move-
ment would be adversely affected if the corporation was required
to forego its property rights, which are arguably violated.' 6' It is
unlikely that it would be easier to find compelling state interests
justifying an infringement of the right to travel intrastate than
to travel interstate. Consequently, by authorizing eminent do-
main in the Raiders situation, the California Supreme Court
gave the City of Oakland, and every other municipality,1 62 a li-
cense to immobilize both man and his business so as to stunt the
growth of American business.
2. The effect on interstate commerce
If the City of Oakland could use eminent domain to keep
the Raiders from moving within California, then it could also
prevent the franchise from moving out of the state. Such an ex-
ercise of power would interfere with interstate commerce.
Black's Law Dictionary defines commerce as "[t]he exchange of
goods, productions, or property of any kind... [and] [t]he trans-
portation of persons and property."'6 8 This definition suggests
that commerce includes the transportation of property of any
kind, including a business. The majority's interpretation of the
eminent domain statute, giving California cities the power to
keep businesses within California,'" adversely affects interstate
commerce by reducing the number of businesses that pass
through interstate commerce.
This infringement on interstate commerce implicates the
commerce clause, 165 regardless of the absence of prohibitory fed-
eral statutes.'66 Thus, even if keeping a business such as the
160. See supra note 1.
161. See Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d at 77, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
162. For a list of what constitutes a "public entity" in California, see CAL. CIV.
PRoc. CODE § 1235.190 (West 1982). See supra note 13.
163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (5th ed. 1979).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
165. "The Congress shall have the Power to ... regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 2.
166. The Supreme Court has stated that:
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Raiders within the state may increase the level of economic wel-
fare, 67 this effect would be "too remote and indirect to justify
obstructions to the normal flow of commerce." '168
The danger of such an exercise of power is:
[I]f a state can, in this way, impose restrictions upon interstate
commerce for the benefit and protection of its own citizens, we
are brought back to the condition of things which existed before
the adoption of the Constitution, and which was one of the prin-
cipal causes that led to it.'" 9
VI. Conclusion
Leaving some unresolved issues to be handled by the lower
court, the majority found it permissible for a city to condemn a
viable business. 17  The majority's seemingly conservative ap-
proach is radically impractical. An attempt to follow the "cur-
rent state of the law" does not justify taking black letter law to
its extreme."' All laws and policies affecting a given circum-
stance "must be construed together so as to give each an appro-
priate place in a reasonable and lawful plan.''7
Chief Justice Bird's opinion appears to be an appeal to the
legislature to revise the statute to prevent its being as broadly
The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate
commerce, whatever its form or method, and the decisions of this Court have rec-
ognized that there is scope for its like operation when state regulation nominally
of local concern is in point of fact aimed at interstate commerce, or by its neces-
sary operation is a means of gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant
burdens on those without the state.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1937) (em-
phasis added), reh'g denied, 303 U.S. 667 (1938).
Thus, even in the absence of Congressional action, state regulation of interstate
commerce granting a more favorable position to residents than to nonresidents runs
afoul of the Constitution.
167. For the city's reasons for condemnation, see supra note 11.
168. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524 (1935).
169. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887) (emphasis
added).
170. See supra text accompanying note 78.
171. In Kahn v. Southern Ry. Co., the court examined the implications of certain
ordinances which limited the time that railroads could block a street crossing. Kahn v.
Southern Ry. Co., 202 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1953). It was noted that "the literal interpreta-
tion of the ordinances," would lead to unreasonable restrictions and that it was "not
unreasonable to suppose that this drastic result was intended." Id. at 878.
172. Id.
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interpreted as it has been by the Raiders court.17 3
Addendum
On July 22, 1983, the Superior Court for the County of
Monterey issued an intended decision, resolving the issues that
had been remanded to it in favor of the Raiders. The court de-
termined that the City of Oakland was not authorized to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain for the following reasons: the
personnel contracts were not located entirely within the city;
there was no reasonable probability that the property would be
devoted to a public use; the property sought to be condemned
was not subject to acquisition by eminent domain for the stated
purpose [of public use]; the resolution of necessity was not satis-
factory; and the public interest and necessity of the city did not
require the aquisition of the Raiders.174
Accordingly, the court dismissed the action as to the Oak-
land Raiders' franchise.' 7' The decision is confined, however, to
the facts of the Raiders' situation. Pursuant to the California
Supreme Court's opinion in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raid-
ers,L76 another California city may be able to condemn a busi-
ness attempting to move if it can show that the business will be
put to a necessary public use that requires its condemnation.
Michael Schiano
173. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 & 90.
174. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
175. Id.
176. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
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